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SCHOOL FUNDING UNDER THE NEUTRALITY 




Once again, school choice is on the docket at the U.S. Supreme Court.  The 
case, Espinoza v. Montana Dept. of Revenue,1 involves a tax credit enacted 
in Montana.  The credit is provided to individuals who make donations to 
scholarship organizations that subvent student tuition at private schools, 
including religious schools.2  The Montana Supreme Court set aside the 
program,3 holding that, given the constraints of the First Amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution, the program could not be made compatible with the 
provision in the Montana constitution that prohibits legislative “direct or 
indirect appropriation or payment from any public fund or monies . . . for any 
sectarian purpose or to aid any church [or] school . . . controlled in whole or 
in part by any church, sect, or denomination.”4  Plaintiffs argue that, if that 
is the case, then the Montana constitutional provision itself violates the First 
Amendment.  The grant of certiorari rested, one may reasonably surmise, 
upon the fact that a majority of states have constitutional provisions, known 
as “Blaine Amendments,” similar to Montana’s. 
Its direct challenge to the Blaine Amendments makes Espinoza a 
blockbuster case.  Espinoza is also a direct successor of the Supreme Court’s 
2002 decision in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,5 in which the Court upheld a 
school voucher program.  Both cases concern programs that direct public 
money (or money that, but for its tax treatment, would have been public 
money) to offset tuition in private schools, including religious schools.6  
Parental decisions, rather than government budgets or contracts, determine 
which private schools benefit from those funds.  In Zelman, the Court was 
asked to decide whether the First Amendment permits states to include 
 
*  Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law.  I am grateful to several colleagues 
for their incisive comments.  I also thank the members of my Fall 2019 Education Law 
seminar, who always pushed back, and my student Nora Stewart, who determinedly 
shepherded this Essay from idea to final publication under severely suboptimal conditions. 
 
 1. No. 18-1195 (U.S. argued Jan. 2, 2020). 
 2. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 15-30-3101–3114 (2020). 
 3. Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 435 P.3d 603, 614 (Mont. 2018), cert. granted, 
139 S. Ct. 2777 (2019). 
 4. MONT. CONST. art. 10, § 6, cl. 1. 
 5. 536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
 6. See generally id. 
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religious schools among the private schools eligible to receive such funds.  
The Court held, subject to several provisos, that it does.  Eighteen years later, 
in Espinoza, the Court is considering whether the First Amendment requires 
a state with such a program to permit religious schools to receive program 
funds on the same basis as any other private school. 
Espinoza, as Zelman did before it, has two discrete policy communities on 
edge, both oscillating between excitement and dread.7  The first community 
cares about religion.  Disputants offer competing visions of the proper 
relationship between religion and the public sphere.  The second community 
wars over educational markets.  Its organizing question is whether public 
schooling should be organized as a set of local public monopolies, as has 
been traditional, or whether multiple schools ought to be allowed to enter 
local markets and compete with one another.  Although these two issues 
seem, at least on the conceptual level, to be discrete, Espinoza has galvanized 
both policy communities, each viewing the case to be a potentially 
momentous turning point.8 
But that discreteness is ultimately illusory.  At their deepest level, debates 
over church and state on one hand and over market competition in schooling 
on the other both ask how the state should involve itself in people’s decisions 
about how, fundamentally, it is best to view the world.  And American 
constitutionalism approaches this issue fundamentally differently, and 
inconsistently, pursuant to the church/state frame than it does under the 
school-choice frame.  The guarantee of religious freedom is understood to 
require government to abstain as people formulate many aspects of their 
fundamental world view.  But the Progressive imperative of “common 
schooling,” which is the small-c constitution of American public education 
(and an explicit constitutional requirement in some states), takes exactly the 
opposite view.  Common schooling requires people to come together, 
through the institutions of popular sovereignty, to define a worldview and 
then build schools that will inculcate it in all children, so that, ultimately, 
values will be widely shared across the polity.  Religious freedom is pluralist.  
Common schools are communitarian.  Religious freedom requires the state 
to be agnostic about the nature of the good.  Common schooling insists that 
the state take a stand. 
By bringing these two frames together, Espinoza is the harbinger of 
possible, future, direct conflict between them.  Under the principle that 
government may not privilege irreligion over religion, one might ask why 
public, common education, which the Court has held must be secular, can 
enjoy public subsidies not available (in size or kind) to religious education.  
Espinoza and Zelman by no means ask that question.  Indeed, they are 
 
 7. Aaron Jay Saiger, School Choice and States’ Duty to Support “Public” Schools, 48 
B.C. L. REV. 909, 946–47 (2007). 
 8. See Emma Green, Your Neighbor’s Christian Education, Courtesy of Your Tax 
Dollars, ATLANTIC (Oct. 13, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/10/ 
supreme-court-private-schools/599956/ [https://perma.cc/M8TL-QY8N] (summarizing 
expectations of various groups). 
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carefully framed not to suggest that the special status of public education 
might violate the First Amendment.  But the question awaits.  It took eighteen 
years to get from Zelman’s “may” to Espinoza’s “must.”  Perhaps in another 
eighteen, a case may ask whether common schools, both free and secular, can 
receive public funds only when they are simply players in a market, 
competing on equal terms with all other schools. 
If the Court, and the country, get to that question, it is hard to be sure which 
view will prevail.  Based on current conditions, and for a variety of reasons, 
the best guess—and it is only a guess—is that common schooling might be 
forced to give way before a rigorously read First Amendment duty of the 
state to avoid preferring irreligion over religion.  This need not signal the end 
of the Progressive educational vision, however.  It will be possible for those 
committed to the values inherent in common schooling to regroup, 
reconsidering some of their positions in order to advance their core 
commitments. 
I.  CHOICE VERSUS THE COMMON SCHOOL 
90 percent of American students attend public schools,9 which are funded 
by the state and charge no tuition.  The parents of the remaining 10 percent, 
exercising their constitutional right to reject public schooling in favor of 
private alternatives, send their children to schools that receive only negligible 
state funding and (with rare exceptions) do charge tuition.  A number of states 
now use public funds to offset the tuition costs of families who exercise this 
right.  States’ arrangements take a variety of institutional forms, including 
vouchers, tax credits, and education savings accounts.10  All of these 
arrangements share a fundamental design.  They direct public money to 
private schools—but which particular private schools receive funds depends 
on families’, not governments’, choices. 
Espinoza, along with Zelman and several other cases that have been 
decided during the decades that separate the two, are framed only as 
applications of First Amendment principles to those subsidies, given that 
some recipient schools may be religious.11  The cases thus seem to say 
nothing about the funding or management of the public schools that educate 
90 percent of American schoolchildren free of charge. 
None of this is remarkable.  Education is not the only or the most important 
sector in which religious providers participate and in which the government 
subsidizes private purchases of privately produced goods in order to further 
the public interest.  Obvious examples include vouchers for food purchased 
 
 9. See Private Elementary and Secondary School Enrollment and Private Enrollment as 
a Percentage of Total Enrollment in Public and Private Schools, by Region and Grade Level:  
Selected Years, Fall 1995 Through Fall 2015, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., 
https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d17/tables/dt17_205.10.asp [https://perma.cc/2ACZ-
DRRE] (2015 data). 
 10. Julie F. Mead, The Right to an Education or the Right to Shop for Schooling:  
Examining Voucher Programs in Relation to State Constitutional Guarantees, 42 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 703, 706 (2015). 
 11. See, e.g., Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125 (2011). 
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by the poor and tax credits for health insurance purchased by the employed.  
Moreover, such programs can operate in parallel with in-kind provision of 
similar services by the state.  A state that partially subsidizes private schools 
even as it provides free public schooling on request is similar to a government 
that provides food stamps12 while also purchasing and directly distributing 
foods to needy consumers,13 or a nation that provides tax subsidies to 
purchases of private health insurance,14 even as it also directly insures 
persons through Medicaid or Medicare Part A.15 
This is not to say, of course, that subsidies in a private market have no 
impact on the parallel public sector.  Every market subsidy affects markets 
for substitute goods, including goods publicly provided.  Government 
provision of agricultural surplus goods to schools affects how food stamps 
are used.  That premiums for employer-provided health insurance are not 
taxed affects demand (and prices) for both Medicare and insurance provided 
on the open market.  Educational subsidies likewise depress demand for 
publicly provided education, as any subsidy must. 
Briefs and judicial opinions in cases like Espinoza and Zelman—cases that 
ask whether and how religious schools may be included among private 
schools receiving public funds—generally treat these substitution effects as 
marginal, just as they would if the subsidies at issue were destined for kosher 
grocery stores or Catholic hospitals.  Substitution effects enter the analysis 
where relevant, but the focus is on the place of religion in the semi-
subsidized, private sector of the industry.  It is assumed that the public 
sector—public schools—will continue to provide services directly, using 
only public monies, with no financial transaction whatsoever involving 
students’ families. 
In the broader legal, political, and popular conversations regarding 
government subsidy for school choice, however, subsidies for private school 
tuition have for decades been framed as frontal attacks upon the institution 
of the public school.  This framing is quite different from that applied to food 
aid, hospitals, or other state efforts to subsidize the private side of a market 
that includes both government and private providers.  And it is a framing 
equally prevalent among educational subsidies’ detractors and their 
proponents.  On the mainstream and Democratic left, the public school is an 
embattled institution that needs defending against rapacious “neoliberals.”16  
 
 12. See 7 U.S.C. § 2011 (2018). 
 13. See 7 C.F.R. § 250.1 (2020) (stating that food purchased by the Department of 
Agriculture is then donated to consumers pursuant to various federal statutes). 
 14. See I.R.C. § 106(a) (2020). 
 15. See 42 C.F.R. § 405.201 (2020). 
 16. “Neoliberal” is a perfectly good word, denoting a preference for market-based policies 
over government provision of services. See David Singh Grewal & Jedediah Purdy, 
Introduction:  Law and Neoliberalism, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2014, at 1, 1–3.  
But the term’s adoption by its academic and political opponents as a self-explanatory synonym 
for “contemptible,” and its concomitant abandonment by those sympathetic to it, have ruined 
it for descriptive use. See id. at 1–3, 6.  For a failed attempt to rescue the term in the context 
of schools shorn of emotional valence, see Aaron Saiger, Charter Schools, the Establishment 
Clause, and the Neoliberal Turn in Public Education, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1163, 1166 (2013). 
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On the religious and libertarian right, the “government school” is a sclerotic 
beast long past its usefulness, ripe for tearing down.  Only recently, as 
“Medicare for All” proposals have entered public discourse, have we seen 
comparable levels of emotion and binary thinking in other sectors where state 
subsidy is important.17 
These reactions seem disproportionate and overwrought in both legal and 
economic terms.  Why, then, do they take up so much space in the dialogue 
over this issue?  Among several possible explanations, the most basic is that 
the debate over educational choice is a deeply ideological one.  The 
government that subsidizes your food purchases is entirely indifferent to 
whether you do your grocery shopping at government-run or private 
groceries.  Proposals for a public health care option (though not for single-
payer insurance) seek a health-care system that leaves it up to patients 
whether they prefer public or private insurance, without imposing a 
preference as to which they choose.  But, for many, the government that 
subsidizes public education necessarily must provide it in a publicly run and 
publicly governed institution. 
This commitment can be clearly traced to the project initiated by Horace 
Mann and his colleagues in the antebellum period.  Mann sought to replace 
a system of haphazard, hyperlocal, and privatized institutions with a system 
of common schools.  Common schools would be experienced by rich and 
poor, Congregationalist and Calvinist, native and immigrant, alike.  
Common-ness, Mann thought, was critical to a functioning polity.  
Furthermore, it was essential in a period when class differences loomed large, 
immigration was surging, and the diversity of the nation changing—all 
features shared by Mann’s age and our own.18  Common-school reformers 
were explicit that their project was motivated in substantial part by a desire 
to detach immigrant children from the culture and politics (and religions) of 
their families and instill in them opinions and attitudes more “American.”  
The common school thus was designed to mitigate parental preferences about 
their children’s education in favor of a state orthodoxy.19 
As the idea that education was not only a public good but a tool to achieve 
desirable political homogenization penetrated the United States, it became 
 
 17. Compare Medicare for All Is a Meaningless Slogan, ECONOMIST (Oct. 13, 2018), 
https://www.economist.com/leaders/2018/10/13/medicare-for-all-is-a-meaningless-slogan 
[https://perma.cc/DTV3-CGHE], and Reihan Salam, “Medicare for All” Is a Fantasy, 
ATLANTIC (Aug. 30, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/08/medicare-for-
all-is-a-fantasy/568957/ [https://perma.cc/23X4-HXBM], with Meagan Day & Bhaskar 
Sunkara, Opinion, Why America Needs Medicare for All, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/10/opinion/medicare-for-all-health-costs.html 
[https://perma.cc/6KAJ-YU4Z]. 
 18. A committee of the National Education Association wrote in 1919 that the purpose of 
education is to “insure the acquisition of those habits, skills, knowledge, ideals, and prejudices 
which must be made the common property of all, that each may be an efficient member of a 
progressive democratic society.” LAWRENCE A. CREMIN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE 
SCHOOL:  PROGRESSIVISM IN AMERICAN EDUCATION, 1876–1957, at 193 (1964). 
 19. See Aaron Saiger, Deconstitutionalizing Dewey, 13 FLA. INT’L U. L. REV. 765, 785 
(2019). 
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entangled with various other principles that we now associate with the 
Progressive era.  The emphasis on the nonsectarian nature of the public 
schools became more emphatic.  A particular compromise between 
democracy and elitism, in which public schools would be governed by locally 
and democratically elected boards, but with a strong de facto noöcratic 
presumption of deference to self-styled “experts,” became the norm.  
Pedagogically, public schools were to function in important respects as 
miniature democratic communities, so that students could learn citizenship 
experientially.  All of these principles both rely and expand upon the idea of 
the public school as a common, standardizing, homogenizing, and state-
centered enterprise.20 
In the 1920s, as the diffusion of Progressive schooling progressed, the 
Lochnerian Supreme Court tapped the brakes.  In a series of cases it set aside 
various state efforts, motivated by various forms of nativism and anti-
Catholic sentiment, to prohibit or onerously regulate private schooling.21  
The Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment does not permit states to seek 
entirely to “standardize” children.22  Compulsory education was 
constitutional but compulsory public education was not. 
These cases made clear, however, that parents who chose to exit the public 
schools were obligated not only to find a private substitute but to pay for it 
themselves.  This created an enormous financial incentive to use the public 
schools.23  As a result, a private sector grew up alongside the Progressive 
public schools, but the latter dominated the field.  The private sector, 
moreover, was dominated by religious schools, where parents might be 
thought to be especially willing to pay and where philanthropy as well as 
tuition was available to support the effort.  In the subsidized public schools, 
meanwhile, the common-school and Progressive paradigms saw enormous 
success.  They were widely adopted by World War I.  By the middle of the 
century, they were hegemonic, the small-c constitution of American public 
schooling.  Indeed, many states explicitly included the word “common” in 
the education clause of their constitutions.24 
This explains why advocacy for school choice is understood, on both sides, 
as an attack on the very idea of public schools.  The common school views 
the private sector as a grudging concession, and the cost advantage of public 
education as one of that concession’s most important mitigators.  School 
 
 20. In a recent op-ed on Espinoza, Sarah Vowell wrote, “The public schools the framers 
[of the Montana constitution] conjured ask the taxpayers to splurge on fairness, not privilege, 
to pull together, not away.” Sarah Vowell, Opinion, The Supreme Court Could Upend This 
State’s Schools Over $150, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/ 
18/opinion/supreme-court-school-choice.html [https://perma.cc/H5X8-32JL]. 
 21. See generally Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927); Pierce v. Soc’y of 
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
 22. This conclusion was founded squarely in Lochner-era ideas of freedom of contract.  
But these holdings have survived the repudiation of Lochner, having been recast as questions 
of parental liberty to raise children as they like. 
 23. See Stephen D. Sugarman, Using Private Schools to Promote Public Values, 1 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 171, 181 (1991). 
 24. See Saiger, supra note 7, at 932 & n.138 (2007). 
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choice, on the other hand, finds no virtue in common-ness.  The genius of the 
market is that it can accommodate diverse preferences without government 
intervention.  One needs a free (and fairly subsidized) market in order to 
generate a diverse population of schools, with different approaches, 
philosophies, and curricula, that responds to consumer demand.  A system 
that revolves around democracy, expert control, and homogenization is 
inimical to one that centers the sovereign consumer.  And a school system 
that relies upon consumer sovereignty is exactly the opposite of a system of 
common schools. 
One can think of unfairness, or discrimination, in terms of markets or of 
democracy.  From a market point of view, it is hard reasonably to deny that 
the common school is unfair, or even, perhaps, discriminatory.  Parents 
whose politics and culture are in the mainstream generally find their 
preferences satisfied by the common school; those with atypical backgrounds 
or dissident views generally do not.  To say that the former can have the 
schools they want for free, whereas the latter must arrange for and pay for 
the schools that they want, is not “fair.” 
On the other hand, even though public schools are local monopolies, the 
single free-of-charge option is available to everyone.  What those schools are 
like and how they are funded is determined through democratic decision-
making.  If the polity’s procedures for reaching decisions are fair, then this 
arrangement is politically “fair.” 
It is a hallmark of the success of Progressivism that political fairness, not 
consumer fairness, was for so long the unquestioned basis of school 
governance.  This posture is deeply tied to the Progressive view that schools’ 
task is to form future citizens, which centers democratic decision-making as 
a fair procedure.  But the political account of fairness is no longer absolutely 
dominant.  This is due, in no small part, to the ways in which the democratic 
procedures of contemporary school governance are deeply unfair, due mostly 
to hyperlocalism inflected by race.25  Even setting procedural unfairness 
aside, however, some school choice advocacy directly critiques the 
Progressive idea of political fairness.  In our contemporary moment, they 
argue, commonality is no longer and should no longer be our governing 
value.  Even in politics, we should be committed to diversity, to formal 
fairness to individuals, to the idea that there is no one single idea of the good. 
II.  RELIGIOUS FREEDOM VERSUS THE COMMON SCHOOL 
These latter claims—that markets are fairer, and in particular more tolerant 
of dissidence, than politics—resonate in American First Amendment 
constitutionalism. The principles of both nonestablishment and of free 
exercise are about protecting the opinions of the few from the potential 
tyranny of the many.  With respect to religion, there is no question in 
American law that what I have called consumer fairness, not democratic 
fairness, is the kind of fairness we seek.  The religious views of the 
 
 25. See infra Part III. 
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individual, however divergent from the norm, are entitled to equal treatment 
as against dominant views.  The guarantee of free exercise means that 
individuals get to choose whether, how, and with which kind of religion they 
wish to affiliate, and that the state must keep its hands off those choices.  That 
word choose makes the First Amendment friendly to claims about markets, 
which are based on choice, and unfriendly to claims that people should be 
treated the same and their political and social opinions standardized. 
This—along with the fact the private-school sector is predominantly 
religious, with religious schools enrolling more than 80 percent of all private 
schools—has drawn pro-market, anti-Progressive ideologues to the First 
Amendment like moths to a flame.  The complainants in Espinoza, as in 
Zelman before it, insist upon a consumer view of unfairness.  However far a 
religious school may be from the mainstream, in matters of religion, that 
distance cannot be allowed to matter.  In particular, the principle that the state 
cannot prefer irreligion to religion means that it cannot have an opinion as to 
whether religious education is better or worse than secular education.26  
Common schooling, of course, is all about the state having an opinion. 
By framing their cases as cases about religion—and by litigating in federal 
court, under a federal constitution that is understood to grant no educational 
rights—school choice has elevated the market frame to the center of the 
choice debate. 
If we understand the First Amendment framing as elevating a kind of 
choice foreign to the idea of the common school, Espinoza can be seen, 
potentially, as midwifing a tremendous paradigm shift in American 
education.  It took nearly two decades to arrive at Espinoza’s “must” from 
Zelman’s “may.”  What seeds might Espinoza plant that could flower several 
decades from now? 
During oral argument in Espinoza, Justice Breyer imagined one such 
flowering.  He asked the lawyer for the complainants whether a state’s 
decision to fund its secular public schools might trigger a duty to fund 
religious schools as well, under a First Amendment principle of 
nondiscrimination against religion: 
What [do] you think of this? . . .  Say in San Francisco or Boston or take 
any city or state, and they give many, many, many millions of dollars to the 
 
 26. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) (“The First Amendment mandates 
governmental neutrality between religion and religion, and between religion and 
nonreligion.”); Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963) (“[T]he 
State may not establish a ‘religion of secularism’ in the sense of affirmatively opposing or 
showing hostility to religion, thus ‘preferring those who believe in no religion over those who 
do believe.’” (quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952)); Douglas Laycock, 
Formal, Substantive and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993, 
1001 (1990) (“[T]he religion clauses require government to minimize the extent to which it 
either encourages or discourages religious belief or disbelief, practice or nonpractice, 
observance or nonobservance.”); see also Christopher B. Harwood, Evaluating the Supreme 
Court’s Establishment Clause Jurisprudence in the Wake of Van Orden v. Perry and 
McCreary County v. ACLU, 71 MO. L. REV. 317, 339 (2006) (“The neutrality principle calls 
for government to remain nonaligned with respect to religion—that is, government must not 
favor one religion over another, religion over secularism, or secularism over religion.”). 
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public school system.  And a lot of them give a lot of money to charter 
schools.  Now, they don’t give money to Catholic schools.  All right?  Now, 
if—if we decide you’re [i.e., the complainants are] right, does that all 
change? 
. . . I’m not talking about scholarships. . . .  I’m talking about the X billion 
dollars that the State of New York spends on the public school system, and 
I don’t know how much, but I suspect they might spend money on charter 
schools. . . .  If I decide for you, am I saying that they have to give money 
to the—same amounts proportionate to—to the parochial school?27 
When complainant’s counsel responded as if Justice Breyer was asking 
about the structure of state funding across different types of private schools, 
the justice tried again: 
Oh, oh, what’s the private?  Why is it that they [i.e., state subsidies] have 
to be equal with private [i.e., equal for both religious and secular private 
schools] but they [i.e., the subsidies given to religious schools] don’t have 
to be equal with [those given to] public [schools]? . . .  My hypothetical was 
they give it out in—it’s called the Public School System of the United 
States.  I’m saying that’s what I’m talking about.  Now, what’s your 
response?  What’s the difference between this case, you win, and the same 
with the public schools, they have to give it to parochial schools too.  
What’s the difference?28 
Once again, the attorney ducked Breyer’s question.  He either did not 
understand it or pretended that he did not.  When Justice Kagan changed the 
subject, Breyer gave up. 
What Justice Breyer wanted to know is:  might providing public education 
at all, given that it must be secular under the Establishment Clause, trigger a 
state duty to proportionally fund private religious education, lest it violate the 
principle that states may not favor irreligion over religion?29 
Breyer’s question is not only incisive but resonates particularly in the 
context of Espinoza.  The Espinoza complainants make a supremacy-clause 
argument, arguing that a state constitutional provision, the Blaine 
Amendment, must yield to the federal First Amendment.  The Montana 
Supreme Court acknowledged that supremacy problem but sought to 
reconcile the two by disallowing tax credits that support any private 
scholarships, religious or not.30  The court thus sought to avoid religious 
discrimination by cementing the special advantages of the public school 
system, which is secular.  The complainants argue that this is unacceptable 
 
 27. Transcript of Oral Argument at 24–26, Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, No. 18-
1195 (U.S. Jan. 22, 2020) [hereinafter Espinoza Transcript]; cf. Mead, supra note 10, at 704 
(noting a colloquy with Justice Nancy Rice of the Colorado Supreme Court similar to the one 
described here). 
 28. Espinoza Transcript, supra note 27, at 26–27. 
 29. See supra note 26. 
 30. Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 435 P.3d 603, 615 (Mont. 2018), cert. granted, 
139 S. Ct. 2777 (2019). 
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because a retreat to secularism constitutes discrimination against “religion in 
general,” and is therefore unconstitutional.31 
Breyer’s hypothetical tracks the structure of this argument precisely.  The 
duty to provide public schooling is imposed by state constitutions.32  The 
First Amendment requires that schooling be secular.  But that secularism in 
publicly provided schools is necessary does not obviate the possibility of 
unconstitutional discrimination against “religion in general.”33  And this 
possibility raises Breyer’s extraordinary question.  Is the public school as we 
know it, free, common, secular, and governmentally (expertly) run—is that 
school, whatever its failings, still a pillar of the republic?34  Can the public 
articulate the values of society and educate all its students in those values, 
permitting exit, to be sure, but only partially35 and while triggering a 
substantial additional financial burden? 
This question is so far out of the mainstream that it seems almost fanciful.  
Even among school choice advocates, it is rare to hear that equal funding 
should be provided to all schools, including public schools, on precisely the 
same terms.  Among choice opponents, energy has focused on building new 
arguments that would enlarge the special status of public schools, given state 
constitutional requirements, as against other kinds of schools.36  The 
Supreme Court itself, not very long ago in Locke v. Davey,37 blessed a 
decision to make students in religious graduate programs ineligible for a 
secular scholarship program, finding that this sort of preference for 
secularism reflected no “animus toward religion” and citing the “play in the 
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 36. See Black, supra note 32, at 1363–64; Derek W. Black, The Constitutional 
Compromise to Guarantee Education, 70 STAN. L. REV. 735, 746 (2018); Goodwin Liu, 
Education, Equality, and National Citizenship, 116 YALE L.J. 330, 334–35 (2006). 
 37. 540 U.S. 712 (2004). 
2020] SCHOOL FUNDING POST-ESPINOZA 223 
joints” between the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses.38  And the 
mere fact that the question came from Justice Breyer, who is “legendary for 
asking absurd hypothetical questions,” might lead one to discount it further.39 
I am not suggesting here that the special status of public schools is 
unconstitutional, or that the Supreme Court is poised to declare it to be 
unconstitutional in the short term.  I mean to suggest only that Breyer’s 
hypothetical is far from “absurd.”  It is consistent with trends in American 
constitutional law, which Espinoza tees up.  Why is it unconstitutional to 
treat private religious schools differently from secular private schools, but 
still constitutional to treat them differently from secular public schools? 
The recent Trinity Lutheran decision holds that churches may not be 
excluded from participating on equal terms in a “government benefit program 
without having to disavow its religious character.”40  It is not that large a 
stretch, especially with the advent of student-based budgeting methods for 
allocating public school funds,41 to treat education funding as “a government 
benefit program.”  Already, several scholars have wondered about the 
constitutionality of state statutes that make religious schools ineligible for 
charter-school status.42  Among them, Professor Stephen Sugarman has 
argued forcefully that the religious charter exclusion is unconstitutional, 
precisely because it prefers irreligion to religion.43 
In 2020, in short, Breyer’s hypothetical has coherence.  The First 
Amendment does prohibit public programs that discriminate because of 
religion.  This includes discrimination against religion.  When a state chooses 
not only to fund but to manage free, public schools, which are secular, 
perhaps that does trigger a duty to treat religious schools the same, and fund 
them proportionately.  That the Establishment Clause demands that religious 
schools exist only in the private sector, and that the Fourteenth Amendment 
liberty guarantee demands that they not be forced into secular schools, does 
not change this duty. 
The avulsive character of this question naturally led complainants’ 
attorney in Espinoza to insist that he sought only equity within the private 
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sector, not between private schools and public ones.44  But the intuition that 
religious-school pupils deserve the same level of subsidy for their educations 
as other pupils resonates with contemporary First Amendment thinking.  In 
2020, it still seems a bridge too far; but Espinoza would have seemed 
similarly overambitious when Zelman was decided in 2002.  Perhaps Breyer 
has outlined the core claims of the big school-choice case a few decades 
down the road. 
III.  A VISION OF THE REPUBLIC:  COMMON SCHOOLING IN A PLURALIST 
CONTEXT 
Suppose we were to find ourselves, some decades hence, in a world—I 
emphasize again, this is not our world in 2020, but it is a plausible future—
when the twin First Amendment commands that (a) the state not privilege 
irreligion over religion, and (b) state schools themselves can have no 
religion—might be thought to demand public funding of religious schools, at 
levels equal to funding for public schools.  What would that world hold for 
those committed to common schooling?  They will continue to think that a 
vital democratic education is one, as Horace Mann put it, that is “free, 
financed by local and state government, controlled by lay boards of 
education, mixing all social groups under one roof, and offering education of 
such quality that no parent would desire private schooling.”45  To this list 
might be added the Progressive values that schools should instill “American” 
values in all children, and that going to school should be practice for 
citizenship.46  Would such persons find their vision finally extinguished by 
the neoliberal apocalypse that had been predicted, but failed to materialize, 
in the wake of Zelman and Espinoza?47  Not necessarily.  Common-schoolers 
could act to maintain their educational commitments even if a strong version 
of First Amendment nondiscrimination insisted upon treating religious and 
government-run schools with parity. 
Three strategies suggest themselves.  They will not maintain everything 
valuable about the common-school vision of the Progressives, but they will 
help to preserve most of its most important features. 
1.  Practice what you preach.  There can be no question that the greatest 
challenge to the viability of the common-school paradigm is not market 
competition but the overwhelming extent to which we have permitted the 
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quality and shape of education to vary across social gaps in the United States, 
above all the gap between rich and poor.48  If the schools in poor zip codes, 
in distressed rural and urban areas, are wretched, and those in tony suburbs 
fabulous, in what sense do we have “common” schooling?49  Many would 
argue that the world today defined by American public schooling treats 
schooling nearly as a purely private good,50 one bargained for in the 
marketplace for real estate.51  On this view, commitments to “public” 
schooling are just a thin patina, a pretext whose plausibility is preserved only 
because we have unjustifiably joined the marketplace for school with the 
marketplace for housing. 
If schooling is understood as a private good, and public schools are known 
to be in no way common, then it will be virtually impossible to seek to 
preserve the common-school ethic.  On the other hand, if public schools 
could in fact become more “common” and less stratified, appreciation for 
Progressive education might improve.  Efforts like Zelman and Espinoza 
have capitalized upon the low quality of the public options available to poor 
parents, which makes them interested in religious schools and available to be 
drafted as plaintiffs.52 
2.  Regulate.  States routinely regulate industries that span the public and 
private sectors by enacting generally applicable rules.  The willingness to 
regulate private education in this way has generally been low.  This, I feel 
sure, is because publicly provided education is “regulated” as a concomitant 
feature of its production, while the large subsidy for public education has 
suppressed demand for private alternatives.  Absent the differential subsidy, 
the state can realize some of the common-school vision by explicitly 
demanding that private as well as public schools pursue it.  Command and 
control, without discrimination based upon religion, does not elicit First 
Amendment objections. 
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What could be regulated?  Most obviously, curriculum, and civics 
curriculum in particular.  Many states are quite laissez-faire about this, but 
they need not be.  New York State is an outlier, with substantial curriculum 
regulation and newly enacted (and controversial) provisions for strong 
enforcement.53  (The wisdom of New York’s approach in a world where 
differential subsidies persist can be questioned.)  The old 1920s cases make 
it clear that extensive curricular regulation like New York’s applied to private 
schools is constitutional.54  Moreover, those cases strongly suggest that 
regulation can include requirements of values education and with respect to 
pedagogical methods.55 
The other obvious area to consider for regulation is admissions and the 
design of peer groups.  Insisting upon nondiscrimination in schools is no 
more problematic than doing so in places of employment; religious schools, 
like religious employers, might be exempted with respect to religion but not 
other categories.  And discrimination could be defined to extend to 
socioeconomic class and place of residence.  Regulations could govern 
individual classrooms as well as entire schools.  Regulations could tackle the 
disparate impact of admissions rules as well as facial discrimination. 
The principle that the state cannot standardize children would stand.  So 
would the prohibition of too much entanglement of state regulators with 
religious schools.  But these kinds of regulation are not inconsistent with 
those principles. 
3.  Double down on the market.  If the Constitution were to be read to 
require that students in nonpublic religious schools must receive public 
subsidy on the same basis that students in public schools do, the values of 
common schooling would best be served by insisting that parity should also 
extend to nonpublic secular schools.56  This counterintuitive move would 
limit the customer base for religious education, so that most parents signing 
up for religious schooling would do so because they genuinely prefer it.  
(This was emphatically not the case under the Ohio choice programs 
approved in Zelman or the Montana program contested in Espinoza.)  This 
approach also recognizes that a rich, true diversity of schooling options 
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comes closer to providing a common experience than a marketplace 
contaminated by differential subsidies that favor religion. 
Differential subsidies that favor religion are in fact ubiquitous in the 
current school-choice landscape.  As I have argued in the past, the subsidies 
associated with voucher and scholarship programs are too small actually to 
make it possible for educational providers to observe demand in the market 
for particular educational approaches and then to open schools designed to 
meet that demand.57  A $150 scholarship or $2250 voucher is not enough to 
cover the most basic of costs in a start-up venture.  The result is that school 
choice is limited to rich schools and schools with sources of funding other 
than tuition.  That latter category primarily consists of church schools.  This 
is a skewed marketplace that no one who actually embraces market-based 
thinking in the educational sphere should tolerate.  Only in a working market 
does the full range of parental preferences about schooling find expression.  
In that market, the parents who choose religious schools would almost always 
be parents who actually prefer religious education.  That is clearly not the 
case now. 
Would such a move find common cause with those now in the school 
choice movement?  I think so.  If not, this would be evidence that the rhetoric 
of choice really is primarily a pretext for diverting government money to 
religious institutions.  If that were the case, we should expect to see divisions 
emerge within the pro-choice right.  Libertarians and religious schools, many 
of which promote religious values to which libertarianism is foreign, might 
no longer make common cause.  (Perhaps true libertarians, who object to 
educational subsidy at any level, might accept a market skewed to religion 
even without having a commitment to religion.  But such people are almost 
entirely absent from the current school-choice debate.) 
It may be desirable for Progressive educators in our time to recast their 
goals in a somewhat more pluralist way.  Contemporary understanding of 
American democracy, and in particular, of the goals of immigration and the 
process of socializing immigrants into a new nation, do not demand the 
“standardization” of students that so motivated the Progressives and that was 
half-approved by the Pierce Court, with its talk of “patriotic disposition.”58  
We no longer think that good education seeds all students, especially those 
from other nations, with similar political ideas and reflexive respect for 
political authority.  That part of Progressivism no longer appeals. 
The part that does is perhaps best served by a richly diverse, but strongly 
regulated, set of schools that educate students with all sorts of different ideas 
about what constitutes education for a good life.  In that world, religion would 
neither be a maligned stepchild nor have pride of place.  Church schools 
would offer some visions of schooling, among many others.  All those views, 
taken together, fixed by the joint operation of markets and regulatory 
agencies, would constitute the (pluralist) vision of education for this 
Republic.  If that is the vision at the heart of Espinoza, those attuned to 
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Progressive ideas need not feel that losing the case means the failure of their 
cause. 
